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Abstract
Background: The key epidemiological difference between pandemic and seasonal influenza is that the population is largely
susceptible during a pandemic, whereas, during non-pandemic seasons a level of immunity exists. The population-level
efficacy of household-based mitigation strategies depends on the proportion of infections that occur within households. In
general, mitigation measures such as isolation and quarantine are more effective at the population level if the proportion of
household transmission is low.
Methods/Results: We calculated the proportion of infections within households during pandemic years compared with
non-pandemic years using a deterministic model of household transmission in which all combinations of household size
and individual infection states were enumerated explicitly. We found that the proportion of infections that occur within
households was only partially influenced by the hazard h of infection within household relative to the hazard of infection
outside the household, especially for small basic reproductive numbers. During pandemics, the number of within-
household infections was lower than one might expect for a given h because many of the susceptible individuals were
infected from the community and the number of susceptible individuals within household was thus depleted rapidly. In
addition, we found that for the value of h at which 30% of infections occur within households during non-pandemic years, a
similar 31% of infections occur within households during pandemic years.
Interpretation: We suggest that a trade off between the community force of infection and the number of susceptible
individuals in a household explains an apparent invariance in the proportion of infections that occur in households in our
model. During a pandemic, although there are more susceptible individuals in a household, the community force of
infection is very high. However, during non-pandemic years, the force of infection is much lower but there are fewer
susceptible individuals within the household.
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Introduction
The emergence [1] and global spread [2,3] of a novel human strain
of influenza A during 2009 highlighted the need for a strong evidence
base to support health policy during the early stages of global
infectious disease outbreaks. Even though the burden of illness was
substantial [4], the 2009 strain was much less severe than previous
pandemics [5], in particular compared to 1918 [6]. From a policy
perspective, a less severe pandemic was challenging because costly
interventions could not be justified. With hindsight, the 2009
pandemic served mainly to highlight the need for the scientific
community and public health planners to rapidly and accurately
assess the severity of an emerging respiratory disease. However,
despite the mild recent pandemic, it seems likely from the initial
public response that more expensive interventions such as household
quarantine and antiviral prophylaxis would be implemented in many
countries during any future moderate or severe pandemics.
The efficacy of household-based mitigation strategies depends
on the proportion of infections that occur within households
during a pandemic [7]. If this proportion is high, then the overall
force of infection experienced by the community at large will be
much reduced by effective household isolation or quarantine. If
the proportion is low, then household-based mitigation strategies
will be less effective. Unfortunately, estimating the proportion of
infection that actually does occur within households is challenging.
Current estimates that approximately 30% of transmission
events occur between members of the same household [8–9] are
based on studies of non-pandemic influenza. In the absence of any
empirical studies from 2009 or earlier pandemic, we conducted a
theoretical study of factors that could contribute to substantial
differences between the proportion of infections that take place
within households during pandemic and non-pandemic years. For
example, the distribution of susceptible individuals in households is
different in the two scenarios. During a genuine pandemic, all
individuals are susceptible and there is no clustering in households.
However, during non-pandemic years, some individuals are
immune due to prior infection or vaccination and their
distribution by household is likely to be clustered: immune
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individuals are more likely to have been infected by a fellow
household member during a previous year than another random
member of the population. One would thus expect susceptible
individuals to be clustered away from immune individuals. Also, the
duration and absolute magnitude of the force of infection from the
community, which is defined as the hazard of infection experienced
by one susceptible individual, is different during a pandemic season
than during a non-pandemic season. The community force of
infection should last longer and be greater during a pandemic.
In the study described here, we used deterministic mathematical
models of influenza transmission over multiple seasons to
investigate the trade-off between changes in the clustering of
susceptible individuals within households and changes in the
absolute force of infection from the community. Specifically, we
sought to test the hypothesis that there could be substantial
differences between the proportion of infections that occur within
a household during pandemic and non-pandemic years even if a)
the underlying transmissibility of influenza is constant and b) the
infectiousness of individuals within the household relative to their
infectiousness outside the household is constant.
Methods
First, we used a compartmental SEIRS model [10,11,12] to
simulate how individuals could be infected with influenza over
multiple decades (Model A). In our simulation study, pandemic
influenza occurred in the first year and non-pandemic influenza
was assumed to be is the first year of a regular annual cycle of
infection. The main dynamic difference between the two types of
influenza season was that the entire population was susceptible in
pandemic whereas was immunity in a proportion of individuals in
the population during non-pandemic years. We defined N as the
total number of individuals in the population, S(t) as the number
who were susceptible to infection from the current strain at day t,
E(t) as the number who had been infected but were not yet
infectious, I(t) as the number who were infectious, and R(t) as the
number who recovered and were presumed to be immune to the
current strain. The force of infection is the hazard of infection
experienced by a single susceptible individual. In our model
we defined it to be l(t)~b(t)I=N, where b(t)~bbase 1z½
A cos tz182ð Þp=182f g [12], bbase is a fundamental unit of
transmission, and A is the amplitude of seasonal forcing which is
used to capture the seasonal oscillations in incidence by changing
the effective transmission rate of the virus. This formulation
implemented a season-based year of 52 seven-day weeks which is
equivalent to 364 days per year with t~0 being the start of the first
week at which the potential for influenza transmission is lowest:
i.e., the middle of temperate summer.
Solutions were initiated at the midpoint of the summer before a
pandemic winter. We assumed that when t~0, there was a single
individual infectious with the pandemic strain (I~1) and all other
individuals were susceptible (S~N{1). The rate of change of
susceptible individuals was defined as _S(t)~vR(t){l(t)S(t),
where v was the reciprocal of the average effective duration of
immunity to influenza in days. Similarly, _E(t)~l(t)S(t){aE(t),
where a was the reciprocal of the average duration of the latent
period in days; _I(t)~aE(t){cI(t), where c was the reciprocal of
the duration of infection; and _R(t)~cI(t){vR(t). The solutions
to the model equations were obtained numerically [13].
Non-household Model A was refined by household-based
Model B using methods similar to those of [14]. We let ns,e,i,r(t)
be the number of households at time t in which s individuals were
susceptible, e were exposed and incubating but not yet infectious, i
were infectious, and r had recovered and were presumed to be
immune. For example, the variable value n2,0,1,0(10)~120:5
indicates that at day 10 there were an expected 120.5 households
of size 3 in which 2 people were susceptible and 1 was infectious.
We considered populations made up of households of sizes 1::H,
with the size of households of type ns,e,i,r equal to szezizr.
Using standard nomenclature for combinations, the total number
of state variables required to describe all possible disease states for
all household sizes was
Pr~H
r~1
C4zr{1r where C
n
r is the number of
possible outcomes by drawing r objects from n objects.
To illustrate the model further, consider the special case of a
population is composed entirely of households of size 1 or 2. There
are 4 combinations for singleton households: n1,0,0,0 , n0,1,0,0 ,
n0,0,1,0 and n0,0,0,1 and C
5
2 for households with size 2. Hence, for
populations with household sizes up to 6, this model formulation
required 209 variables of type ns,e,i,r(t). Note that the number of
households at size 5 or above was collapsed as one number from
Hong Kong census and statistics department. We assumed that the
number of households at size 5 or above as the number of
households at size 5. We defined the set of all possible household
types (combinations of s,e,i,r) for a given H to be xH , which
allowed us to express the values of individual state variables S(t),
E(t), I(t), and R(t) in terms of ns,e,i,r(t), e.g.
S(t)~
X
(s,e,i,r)[xH
sns,e,i,r(t):
Therefore, the community force of infection is driven entirely by
the sum of the household variables, i.e. there is no separate set of
variables for the community dynamics,
ls,e,i,r(t)~b(t)
I(t)
NInd
z
hi
(szezizr{1)d
 
:
Parameter d determined the degree to which household
transmission was genuinely mass action compared with the degree
to which it is pseudo-mass action. If transmission within
households was genuinely mass action (d~0), then members of
very large households had the same chance of being infected by a
single infectious individual as did members of very small
households. If transmission was pseudo-mass action (d~1), then
the expected number of true secondary cases within a single fully
susceptible household is the same for both large and small
households: i.e. infectivity is shared evenly amongst those present.
Parameter h was the scaling ratio for the force of infection within
households relative to that that between households and does have
a direct intuitive interpretation if we consider a special case in
which d=1 and, for one household in our population, the
proportion of infectious individuals within the household is equal
to the proportion of infectious in the community. Under these
circumstances, if h were less than 1, then the force of infection
from the community would be greater than the force of infection
from the household. If h were greater than 1, the balance of
infectious hazards would be reversed.
The dynamic model for a population of households was defined
by a master equation for the time derivative of ns,e,i,r,
dns,e,i,r
dt
~
(iz1)cns,e,iz1,r{1 z (ez1)apns,ez1,i{1,r z
(rz1)vns{1,e,i,rz1 z (sz1)lsz1,e{1,i,rnsz1,e{1,i,r {
sls,e,i,rzeaziczrvð Þns,e,i,r
in which the first four terms corresponded to a different event
(recovery, becoming infectious, loss of immunity and infection). We
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assumed that ns,e,i,a,r~0 if the sum szezizr was less than 1 or
greater thanH or if any s, e, i or r was less than 1 or greater thanH.
Note that Model A is a nested sub-model of Model B: if either the
maximum household size is 1 (H~1) or there was no transmission
within households (h~0), the two models were equivalent.
In general, the basic reproductive number for household models
of infectious disease transmission is difficult to define precisely in a
closed form [15,16]. To ensure that our results were comparable
with those from previous studies of influenza transmission (e.g.
[7,12,17,18,19]), we constrained the cumulative attack rate to be
57.9% in the first year even in the presence of seasonal forcing.
Based on the simple relationship between the attack rate (AR) and
basic reproductive number (Ro) for a mass action system,
R0~
{ ln(1{AR)
AR
, this was equivalent to a basic reproductive
number R0 of 1.5 in Model A [20] .
Some parameter values such as the average duration of the latent
period 1=a and the average duration of the infectious period 1=c
(Table 1) can be assumed with reasonable confidence from empirical
studies. The value R0&1:5 is consistent with a number of analyses of
the 2009 pandemic ([2]; [21]). We adopted R0~1:5 for our baseline
and 1.8 as one of our sensitivity analyses. To capture the behaviour of
severe pandemic as in Scandinavian cities in 1918 pandemic
influenza [22], we examined other plausible value such as 5.4.
However, there is still considerable uncertainty over the most
appropriate values for some parameters in Model A: the average
duration of effective immunity 1=v and the amplitude of seasonal
forcing A. Therefore, we used solutions to Model A (Figure 1) to
choose values for these parameters so that the resulting dynamics
exhibit three characteristics typical influenza A epidemiology in
temperate and subtropical climates. First, the fundamental frequency
of the system falls close to annual cycles [12] within a short period
after a pandemic. Second, the amplitude of seasonal forcing
sufficiently strong that there is a genuine off-season with very little
transmission. Third, the amplitude of seasonal forcing is weak enough
that the system settles down into regular annual cycles: if seasonal
forcing is too strong, there are frequently years with no infections.
Although it would be desirable to estimate these unknown parameters
using unbiased type-specific laboratory confirmed incidence data,
such data are not currently available. Our exercise of parameterisa-
tion calibration was similar a recent exploratory analysis of influenza
seasonality [23]. Also, our estimate of 1=v was also consistent with
the estimate of the appearance of antigentic distinct clusters of other
studies, ranged from 2–8 years[24,25].
Results
We used household Model B to investigate the relationship
between the relative infectivity within households h, the proportion
of infections that occurred within households during pandemic
years aPH , and the proportion of infections that occurred within
households during non-pandemic years aNH (Table 2). The first
equilibrium non-pandemic year which is the first year to produce
regular annual cycle of infection attack rate, by inspection, was
year 15 in our baseline solution (see Figure 1). As h increased from
0.4 to 1.0, so did the proportion of infections that occurred in
households (during both pandemic and non-pandemic years).
However, the magnitude of the increase was not excessive. For
example, doubling h from 0.5 to 1.0 only increased the proportion
of infections in households during pandemics from aPH =26.1% to
aPH =37.0%, and in non-pandemic years from aNH =25.1% to
aNH =35.3%.
We tested the sensitivity of our key findings to the nature of the
force of infection within households not being genuinely pseudo-
mass action (i.e. d=1, Figure 2). Small values of d generated more
infections within the household. Within the confidence bound for
current estimates of d, [0.46,1.21] [8], a large range of values of h
is consistent with a ,30% annual attack rate in equilibrium years.
In addition, the discrepancy between the proportion of infections
that occur within the home during a pandemic year compared
with an equilibrium year increases as the value of d decreases.
Increasing the basic reproductive number R0 did alter the
amplitude of the difference between pandemic and non-pandemic
years. For size 5 households with R0= 1.5, ,47% had more than
3 susceptible individuals in non-pandemic years. With Ro values of
1.8 and 5.4 (Figure 3d and 3f), 28% and 1% of households,
respectively, had more than 3 susceptible individuals. This implies
that there would be less immunity in typical households of infected
individuals with low R0 and more immunity in those with high R0
during non-pandemic years. This balancing results in a similar
proportion of household infection across different R0 in non-
pandemic years given similar proportions of household infection in
pandemic years.
To reduce the sensitivity of our results to specific parameter
choices, we also calculated some additional supporting model
solutions (Tables 3 and 4). A sensitivity analysis on a and c was
performed by doubling and halving the values we used (1/a=1.4
and 1/c=1.2) in Table 1. With 30% within-household attack rate
in non-pandemic year, the percentage point differences in within
house attack rate in non-pandemic years and non-pandemic years
were very similar across different household sizes in Table 3.
Further, different combinations of the seasonal forcing A and
reciprocal of average duration of immunity 1/v could produce
similar within house attack rates in non- pandemic years. We
incorporated three different levels of seasonal forcing on our
dynamic transmission model. Thus, v was estimated such that the
regular annual cycle of infection was observed. With 30% within-
Table 1. Assumed values for transmission models.
Parameter Value(s) Notes
R0 Basic reproductive number 1.5 Midpoint of estimates from [2], consistent with intervals from [19] and [18]
a Reciprocal of average duration
of latent period (days21)
1/1.4 Analysis of a 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic at a New York City school [27]
c Reciprocal of average duration
of infectiousness (days21)
1/1.2 A generation time of 2.6 days [18] [28] and a latent period of 1.4 days
implies an infection duration of 1.2 days for this SEIRS-type model [29]
v Reciprocal of average duration
of immunity (days21)
1=(2:5|364) See Figure 1 and main text.
A Amplitude of seasonal forcing 0.03125 See Figure 1 and main text.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022089.t001
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household attack rate in non-pandemic year, the percentage point
differences in within house attack rate are not substantial across
different household sizes in three different scenarios (Table 4).
As a final observation, we note that differences in the
distribution of susceptible individuals within households during
non-pandemic years compared with pandemic years has impor-
tant implications for the design of clinical trials of household-
based interventions against influenza, especially those that recruit
households via already infected members. In a population in
which the transmission dynamics were well described by the
scenario h~0:7 and d~1, on average, the households of already
infected individuals recruited after seeking health care would have
few additional susceptible members. For example, using the
steady-state solution of Model B with the abovementioned
parameter values, we would expect only ,57.5% of households
of size 3 to have more than one susceptible individual (Figure 3).
Discussion
We defined a plausible transmission scenario for an influenza
pandemic and subsequent non-pandemic equilibrium seasons
using a non-household mathematical transmission model (Model
A). We then extended this to a model in which all household types
were explicitly enumerated (Model B) and found that the
proportion of infections which occurred in households during
pandemics was similar to the proportion that occurred during non-
pandemic years. Although this difference was somewhat sensitive
to the nature of within-household transmission (pseudo-mass-
action verses mass-action), the magnitude of the difference was not
substantial for small values of R0 (say 1.4, 1.8). The sensitivity
analysis on R0 (say R0= 5.4) shows that higher R0 in pandemic
year would show the difference of within household attack rate in
pandemic and non-pandemic years.
The population-level efficacies of pandemic household-based
mitigation strategies are sensitive to the proportion of infections
that occur within households. Mitigation strategies are more
effective when higher proportions of infections occur. It is thus
reassuring that increased community force of infection did not
generate a much lower proportion of infection within households
during pandemics in our model, otherwise, the likely efficacy of
household-based interventions in controlling a pandemic would be
much reduced.
Figure 1. The impact of average immunity duration and the amplitude of seasonal forcing on the dynamics of pandemic and non-
pandemic influenza. a–c show the proportion of the population that was resistant. d–e show the daily incidence as a proportion of the population
(with the y-axis restricted so that the initial peak of incidence in the pandemic is not shown). a and d show the unforced dynamics (A~0) of the
system with an average duration of immunity of 1=v~6:8 years (the average time between two cluster emergence events since the last pandemic in
1968, with clusters defined by [25]. The frequency of oscillations is still less than annual cycles 30 years after a pandemic. b and e show the unforced
dynamics of the system with an average duration of immunity of 1=v~2:5 years. The frequency of oscillations increases to annual cycles within 10
years, but the lack of forcing results in flat non-seasonal incidence shortly afterwards. Note that the reduction of 1=v from 6.8 years to 2.5 years (or
2.56364 days) has no substantial effect on the average proportion of the population that was immune (1{1=R0) because the average duration of
immunity is still much larger than the average duration of infectiousness (v%c) [10]. c and f show the baseline dynamics of our system with
moderate seasonal forcing A~0:03125 and an average duration of immunity at 1=v~2:5 years. Seasonal forcing is strong enough to ensure the
existence of a genuine off-season during which there are very few infections, but not strong enough to force the system into irregular non-annual
cycles (such as those recently described for measles in Niger [30]. The combination of the degree of forcing and the natural frequency of the system
permits low proportions of individuals resistant to influenza during immediately before the start of the season.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022089.g001
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Table 2. Illustrative within-1 and between-household attack rates2 for pandemic and non-pandemic influenza under Ro= 1.5.
Infectivity ratio h Household size Pandemic attack rate Non-pandemic attack rate
Total (% of population)
Within-house (% of
Total) Total (% of population)
Within-house (% of
Total)
0.4 All 57.9 22.8 12.8 22.1
0.5 57.9 26.1 12.7 25.1
0.6 57.9 28.9 12.6 27.7
0.7 1 44.7 0 9.6 0
2 50.0 25.5 11.8 24.0
3 58.1 31.5 12.5 30.0
4 59.8 34.5 12.9 33.1
5 60.8 36.3 13.1 35.1
All 57.9 31.3 12.5 30.0
0.8 All 57.9 33.4 12.4 32.0
0.9 57.9 35.3 12.3 33.7
1.0 57.9 37.0 12.2 35.3
1The attack rate is defined as the number of infections divided by the total number of individuals in households of that size.
2The within-household transmission is expressed as a percentage of the total number of infections.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022089.t002
Figure 2. The within-household transmission percentages in non-pandemic years and the corresponding percentage difference
from that in pandemic years. The contour lines show the percentages of within-household transmission in non-pandemic years, and the heat
chart shows the differences between percentages of within-household transmission in non-pandemic years and pandemic years under different
combinations of h and d. For example, if h~1:0 and d~0:25, then the percentage of within-household transmission in a non-pandemic year would
be 45% and the difference between the percentage of within household transmission in non-pandemic years and pandemic years would be
approximately 2.5 to 3.0%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022089.g002
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The household distribution of Hong Kong, as used in this study,
is similar to those of many other developed nations [26]. However,
less well developed populations and urban sub-populations in
other countries have larger average household sizes. The study of
the impact of household size distributions on infectious disease
dynamics merits further theoretical and empirical study. Also, we
chose not to include vaccination in this study. As an overall
percentage, there are very few populations for which vaccination is
a significant factor in the transmission of influenza. This was
certainly the case during earlier empirical studies on which our
parameters are based. If routine vaccination is extended to a large
proportion of the population (or of school-age children) then future
similar theoretical studies to that presented here should incorpo-
rate vaccination.
Figure 3. Proportion of within household and community infections in pandemic and non-pandemic years and the distribution of
the number of susceptible individuals in non-pandemic year. Proportion of within-household (blue) and community (red) infections in the
first six months of pandemic years (a, c and e) and non-pandemic years (b, d and f) and the distribution of the number of susceptible individuals from
households of 3 (red) , 4 (blue) and 5 (yellow) at the start of non-pandemic years for different values of Ro: (a, b) 5.4 , (c, d) 1.8 and (e, f) 1.5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022089.g003
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To simplify the model and increase its efficiency in solving
hundreds of master equations, the asymptomatic class is excluded
by assuming that the force of infections attributed by asymptom-
atic and symptomatic individuals are equal. The inclusion of
asymptomatic individuals would improve the main results, but
defining the hazard rate between these two groups to match the
attack rates in pandemic years and inter-pandemic years would
increase the uncertainties on extra parameter values.
The interpretation of our results is somewhat limited by our use
of a deterministic framework for the transmission model. Our
representation of an individual’s loss of immunity is very simplistic
– an exponential waiting time distribution from which every
individual’s loss of immunity is derived. We did not explicitly
include births (which were ‘‘rolled’’ into the replenishment of
susceptible individuals) and did not include step changes in the
nature of the pathogen over time, which is sometimes the case for
influenza. Thus, although our results are qualitatively robust,
further studies are required to make more informed estimates of
the scale of the effects we identified. For example, an individual-
based stochastic version of these models and deterministic versions
with step changes in the nature of the antigenic drift are worthy of
investigation.
We have assumed that the basic reproductive number for
influenza is the same in pandemic years as during non-pandemic
years because we have no evidence to suggest the contrary.
However, this equivalence may not be the case, especially during
moderate or severe pandemics. To estimate the reproductive
number for pandemic influenza, recent studies have re-examined
time series of excess mortality from various cities in the United
States and the United Kingdom during the 1918–1919 season
[18,19]. However, these populations may have been aware of the
Table 3. Sensitivity analysis on duration of latent period and duration of infectiousness.
1/a Household size Non-pandemic (% of Total)
% point difference in within-house attack rate between pandemic and
non-pandemic years (Pandemic attack rate - Non-pandemic attack rate)
1/c
0.6 1.2 2.4 0.6 1.2 2.4
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 24.0 24.0 24.0 1.44 1.40 1.35
0.7 3 30.0 30.0 30.0 1.43 1.40 1.35
4 33.1 33.1 33.1 1.35 1.31 1.27
5 35.1 35.1 35.1 1.26 1.22 1.18
All 30.0 30.0 30.0 1.31 1.27 1.21
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 24.0 24.0 24.0 1.50 1.45 1.49
1.4 3 30.0 30.0 30.1 1.48 1.44 1.47
4 33.1 33.1 33.1 1.39 1.35 1.37
5 35.1 35.1 35.1 1.29 1.25 1.26
All 30.0 30.0 30.0 1.34 1.30 1.31
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 24.0 24.0 24.1 1.55 1.37 1.38
2.8 3 30.0 30.0 30.1 1.53 1.37 1.37
4 33.1 33.1 33.2 1.42 1.28 1.28
5 35.1 35.1 35.1 1.31 1.18 1.17
All 30.0 30.0 30.0 1.37 1.22 1.21
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022089.t003
Table 4. Sensitivity analysis on seasonal forcing.
Seasonal
forcing A
Household
size
Non-pandemic
(% of Total)
% point difference
of within-house attack
rate in pandemic and
non-pandemic years
(i.e Pandemic attack
rate - Non-pandemic
attack rate)
0.015625 1 0 0
(1/v= 3.4 years) 2 24.0 1.48
3 30.0 1.47
4 33.1 1.37
5 35.1 1.27
All 30.0 1.32
0.03125 1 0 0
(1/v= 2.5 years) 2 24.0 1.50
3 30.0 1.50
4 33.1 1.40
5 35.1 1.20
All 30.0 1.30
0.0625 1 0 0
(1/v= 1.4 years) 2 24.1 1.32
3 30.1 1.31
4 33.2 1.22
5 35.2 1.13
All 30.0 1.28
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022089.t004
Influenza Infections within Households
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 July 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 7 | e22089
imminent arrival of a pandemic and may have already changed
their behaviour to reduce average levels of transmission. The low
estimates of R0 in these studies may not accurately reflect the
mixing behaviour of populations during non-pandemic transmis-
sion periods. One might define a non-pandemic basic reproductive
number for influenza as the average number of secondary cases
generated by a typically infectious individual in an otherwise
susceptible population in which people have not changed their
mixing patterns in anticipation of a pandemic. We note that if the
non-pandemic basic reproductive number is higher than that of a
pandemic, it would substantially affect the non-pandemic attack
rate (which is determined largely by the average duration of
immunity).
Although the low constant R0 is assumed to be the case
during past pandemics and non-pandemic years as mentioned
above, we cannot rule out the possibility of the transmissibility of
influenza with high constant R0 in the future. To have the
household infection pattern for this scenario, a higher R0 of 5.4,
for instance, could be incorporated into our model. Given 30%
of household infection in non-pandemic years, the estimated h
would be approximately 1.6. Based on this estimated h, quite
different infection patterns would be observed in pandemic and
non-pandemic years. A relatively small proportion of infections
would be attributable to households in non-pandemic years than
in pandemic years. For size 3 households, 37.9% and 28.5%
would experience household infections in pandemic and non-
pandemic years, respectively. This result implies that the current
mitigation strategies recommended for households such as hand
hygiene and mask wearing may not be effective enough to halt
household transmission during pandemics in cases of high
influenza transmission. Even for lower values of R0 such hygiene
measures are unlikely to halt transmission too although to some
extent, these measures will give a reduction in transmission.
It is unfortunate that we needed to rely on the broad properties
of influenza transmission in non-pandemic years to characterize
our baseline transmission scenario. This was necessary due to the
lack of context-specific and unbiased laboratory confirmed
incidence data for influenza in any population: we did not
consider anonymous convenience samples from hospital surveil-
lance networks and incidence estimated from excess seasonal
mortality in all ages to be sufficiently accurate. Given the vast
resources currently being consumed investigating vaccine and
anti-viral candidates, we suggest that it is now appropriate to
instigate multi-centre and multi-year population-based serological
surveillance of influenza incidence. Such a program would be
relatively inexpensive and could be used to rapidly address key
shortfalls in our understanding of influenza epidemiology. If such
accurate representative data were to become available, there
would be great merit in extending the simple conceptual
framework proposed here to include discrete changes in the
serology of circulating strains and age specific transmission. It is
likely, although not certain, that these refinements would need to
be made within an individual-based stochastic version of our
model. Systematically accurate incidence data and more refined
transmission models could be used to make accurate population-
specific estimates of influenza incidence conditional on the
antigenic characteristic of the expected strain and of recent
strains.
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